OPTIMUM FRANCHISE LOCATIONS OF A PROFESSIONAL SOCCER LEAGUE IN THE UNITED STATES

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PROFESSIONAL SOCCER LEAGUE

IN THE UNITED STATES

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PREFACE

This will be brief! Many thanks are due to Dr Rooney, Dr Tweedie and Dr Hecock for their help, generosity and most importantly their patience! Finally, thanks to all the friends I have made at OSU who helped to make this thesis a reality while also delaying its realization!

This thesis is dedicated to my parents and grandparents. Without their support it would not have been possible.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A world record 200,000 people filled the Maracana stadium in Brazil hoping to see their heroes beat Uruguay in the 1950 World Cup final. The Brazilians lost and had to wait another four years for their chance to win the world's most prestigious sporting event. More than a quarter of a century later, on the North American continent, 77,000 people crammed into the Meadowlands, New Jersey and applauded the man who had thrilled and excited them for the last two and a half years; Pele was bidding farewell to his 'beautiful game'. Half a continent away, in the oil-dependent state of Oklahoma, the sun beat down on the artificial turf at Skelly Stadium, as the Tulsa Roughnecks tried to entertain the small crowd who were probably more interested in football and baseball than the game they were watching.

In all these cases the center of attention was a game of soccer; the sport which at one time had threatened to eclipse all others in terms of popularity in the United States.

Soccer in the United States

Soccer is a game which is generally considered to be the world's most popular sport and yet it has had relatively little professional impact in the United States. The recent demise of the North American Soccer League(NASL) seems to imply that a sport which is not part of the American culture will have difficulty finding a niche. A fundamental distinction is that the staple diet of American sports fans - football, baseball and basketball - had their origins in America (though evolving from non-American games in the case of football and baseball) while soccer has been imported to the US.

American children are weaned on the 'traditional' American sports and watch or participate up to the high school level, while at college the more gifted athletes play and the majority spectate. Only the elite play at the professional level, so this could be considered the true spectator sport - the only realistic chance to participate being as a spectator. This hierarchy - many high schools, fewer colleges and very few professional teams - provides for the continual supply of players to make the finished product, which can be enjoyed directly by attendance at a sporting event, or indirectly via one of the branches of the media.

Soccer has not yet consolidated this hierarchy in the United States as is evidenced by the lack of a stable professional league. Due to the game's alien nature,

college soccer developed before high school soccer for the most part. Correspondingly, although Rooney(1975) has stated that professional basketball and football only became profit making ventures after acceptance at the collegiate level, soccer as a whole lacks the grass roots that the triumvirate of traditional American team sports possess. The time frame for acceptance to occur will probably be shorter in today's more technically sophisticated age but there seem to be two possible ways to 'establish' the sport.

Cascio(1975) has developed a progression theory which can be related to soccer. It suggests that a sport will start off with a few children playing it - parents being the core of spectators at this stage. As the children grow up they develop their skills and introduce the sport at high school, college and ultimately the professional level. Some of the parents are still spectating but the bulk of the audience now come from the next generation. Eventually, the 'first generation' players become parents themselves and are more interested in soccer than their own parents who attended because of their child's involvement rather than a love of the sport itself. This process is continually repeated and could be termed the 'grass roots' method of establishment.

The alternative solution is to develop the organization from the top down. By having good professional teams a stimulus can be given to youngsters

who can then 'fill in' the gaps in the hierarchy. In a way this is what the NASL had tried to achieve. By using mostly foreign players, a relatively high standard of play had been placed on show to which young players could aspire. However, houses cannot be built on sand and thus the foundations have to be strong for a professional league to survive. Critics have pointed to the recent collapse of the NASL as an example of bad groundwork, which is partly the case. However, a professional league may provide a model for young players who can develop the underlying structure. In addition, as professional teams can be considered a yardstick or thermometer of a sport's condition in general, a thriving professional league is essential.

The problem with soccer is a lack of commercial interest which has resulted in limited television contracts. Hockey is a similar case. Thus the purpose of this study is to make recommendations which would make a successful professional soccer league in the United States a feasibility. In particular, optimum locations for franchises will be deduced in order to maximize attendance.

History

It is generally agreed that soccer first appeared in the US in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the first form of the sport was played in a colony in Virginia in 1609.

In North American collegiate soccer the early adopters were the Ivy League colleges. However, Harvard led a small group of schools which played rugby and it was this sport that eventually surpassed soccer in terms of popularity and ultimately emerged as the game of grid iron football that we know today. Between 1920 and 1950 intercollegiate soccer was confined almost entirely to the Northeast, although San Francisco and Los Angeles were significant western nodes. After World War Two the college game expanded at a rapid rate mainly due to the influence of American GIs stationed in Europe who revitalized the campus game on their return. The increase in foreign student enrollment at American Universities during the 1960s is considered another factor. Today the college game has spread to most areas of the United States but the professional scene is a different story.

Professional Soccer

The first professional soccer league in the States was the American Soccer League(ASL), created in 1933. It grew from ethnic clubs which fielded teams made up of European migrants and consequently the teams had names such as the Philadelphia Germans and the New Jersey Scots. In the 1930s and 1940s the league was restricted to the North Atlantic Seaboard areas of New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia and Baltimore. The league could be considered semi-professional as teams were primarily

social clubs where making profits was of a secondary concern.

The ASL's decline began when it was stripped of its exclusive rights to professional soccer in the East in 1966 while additional professional rights were granted to the United Soccer Association(USA). The league folded in 1983 but reformed as the United Soccer League(USL). Despite its rich history, the ASL never had any real media attention. This seemed to be reserved for a new professional league which boasted of having some of the world's greatest players. The stage was set for the birth of the NASL.

Two leagues were formed in 1967. The National Professional Soccer League(NPSL) which had a $12 million television contract with CBS, and the USA which was officially sanctioned by America's governing body the United States Soccer Football Association(USSFA). The USA's twelve franchises were represented by whole teams imported from abroad while the NPSL pieced together its ten teams by signing players from all corners of the world. Not surprisingly, attendances were low and five teams dropped out of the two leagues at the end of the season. Despite these early setbacks the owners felt that a professional soccer league could succeed and the two leagues merged to form the NASL in January of 1968.

The main benefit of having only one league was that competition was eliminated between teams in the same city,

but even this was not enough to prevent twelve teams folding by the end of the season, leaving only five franchises for the 1969 season. The average attendance was 3,400 per game in 1968 dropping to below 3,000 in 1969. In 1970 however, two teams from the ASL were persauded to join the NASL and it seemed that the league had survived its worst period. In 1971 the Warner Communications Corporation decided to underwrite the New York Cosmos and attendances rose steadily for the next few years. In 1974 the league expanded to the West Coast for the first time since 1968 and by 1975 the NASL was making comfortable progress. In that year an event occured that could be considered the turning point for all levels of soccer in the United States.

Pele was generally agreed to be the world's best player and had retired from soccer in his native Brazil at a relatively young age. When the New York Cosmos tempted him out of retirement with a lucrative contract, the NASL shot into national recognition. Pele's arrival stimulated the import of other foreign superstars and attendances soared in what had become a twenty team league. However, low attendances continued at some of the marginal franchises implying that the league had already exceeded its optimum size, or that only franchises with 'star' players would survive. By 1977 the league was down to eighteen teams but Pele's influence was still obvious as the Cosmos averaged 34,142 fans for each of their home games.

In 1978 franchise fees were up to $1 million dollars (having originally started in 1968 as $25,000!) but there was no shortage of potential buyers. With new teams and movements accounted for, the NASL expanded to 24 teams for the 1978 season. However this proved to be the NASL's peak as the number of franchises declined steadily each year until the league's collapse in 1985. This can be seen in figure 1 which shows the number of franchises in each year of the league's history.

Reasons for the NASL's Failure

Pele's arrival in the NASL boosted attendance and stimulated interest but also had a negative side effect. Other clubs, seeing the effect that one star could have on a team's attendance, followed suit by buying up 'name' players such as Johan Cruyff, Franz Beckenbauer and George Best. Consequently, wage bills throughout the league shot up.

Reed(1980) has shown that in the NFL 40% of a team's budget is spent on players' salaries while in the NASL it is 70%. Without a large TV contract each team relied on attendance for its revenue and unfortunately the increased crowds throughout the league could not offset the wage bills. The Cosmos averaged 47,000 fans per game in 1978 and yet still lost money, mainly because their roster had enough players to field two full teams and the reserves were all international stars who were paid extraordinary salaries whether they played or not.



Figure 1. The Number of Franchises in the NASL 1968-85

Another significant factor which has possibly hampered the NASL's growth can be loosely termed the 'American culture'. If one considers the major American games of basketball, baseball and football, it can be seen that there is a certain preoccupation with statistics. Rebounds, runs batted in and yards rushing and passing are all food and drink to the American sports enthusiast! Similarly, any sporting event, from the high school up to the professional level, without the ubiquitous cheerleaders and pom pom girls would be considered an anomoly. It could be that traditional American sports lend themselves to these peculiar phenomena whereas soccer does not.

Football, baseball and to a lesser extent basketball, are sports which combine periods of activity with periods of inactivity. Two minute warnings, seventh inning stretches and time outs are just another opportunity for TV companies to show a commercial or report a statistic, while spectators at a live event are entertained by pom pom girls. Conversely, soccer is a free-flowing non stop game divided into two 45 minute halves by a ten minute break. It may be argued that professional soccer's lack of success is due in part to it being a game upon which it is difficult to impose these American sporting traits.

One of the reasons constantly cited as being responsible for the NASL's lack of success was the paucity of Americans on the respective teams. In 1973 75% of the

league's players were foreigners. This had prompted some to claim that the NASL was an acronym for Non American Soccer League! By 1975 each team was required to have six North Americans on their eighteen man roster; the idea being to provide the spectators with players they could identify with.

Unfortunately Pele's effect on the NASL convinced owners that short term profits could be made at the game's expense and so the race was on to buy quality players from abroad while ignoring home grown talent. In addition, coaches skirted the rules by inducing foreign players to become naturalized Americans. Thus the Americans were in a 'Catch-22' situation whereby they were not as skilled as the foreigners and yet were not getting the game time they needed to improve because they were not good enough to get into the starting line-up! Additionally, colleges were not turning out the quality or quantity of players because they only played for three months of the year. Presumably development needs year-round training.

Reed(1980) courted the opinion of Johan Cruyff (Pele's heir apparent to the title of the world's best player) who argued the case for producing more 'home grown' soccer talent in order to save money (According to Nuyer(1979) Warner Communications spent $750,000 on Beckenbauer, $800,000 on Chinaglia and $550,000 for Bogiecevic and Dennis Tueart.) However, Cruyff observed that there were no reserve team schedules and some colleges were reducing their schedules to cut costs.

In 1973, Brown saw Kyle Rote Jr as soccer's great American hope - someone that fans and future players could identify with. He was chosen by the Dallas Tornado in the first round of the draft more because of his local appeal than his college accomplishments. In 1974 the Cosmos then 20 year old Rick Davis was voted the top North American soccer player and assumed Rote's mantle. The fact that these two players stood out pointed to the alarming lack of native American talent. It is perhaps this lack of identification more than anything else, which has been responsible for the game's minimal success in the States.

This 'Americanization factor' can perhaps be seen in the case of indoor soccer which many see as the future of the game in America. The Major Indoor Soccer League(MISL) is a show more than a game and the audience is carefully targeted. Organ music during the game, a running commentary, spotlighted entrances by the players and an ice hockey style rink combine to make the game one of the fastest growing in the country. Half the league players are American and an audience is clearly being found as attendance has doubled in five years and compares favorably with its more mature rivals the NBA and NHL. In fact Eskenazi(1979) quotes the MISL's commissioner, Earl Foreman, as claiming 'We are the future, not the NASL...our game is more exciting, it's better for the spectators and we've got something the kids can relate to - Americans'. This would seem to prove a correlation

between success at the gate and Americanization. Deford(1983) claims that in the modern world all entertainment tastes are exported from not imported to the US - 'Soccer people might just as well try to force a monarchy on the US'. Thus indoor soccer is a uniquely American phenomena and is not an indication of soccer's popularity but of indoor soccer's popularity. It can be considered an entity in itself that competes with rather than as soccer.

This seems to suggest that a strong professional league can provide a model to which Americans can aspire. This could eventually lead to the elimination of the need to import foreign players, while at the same time perpetuating the league's growth with players with which the spectators can identify.

Perhaps the most important factor to be considered is the role of television. Kane(1967) observed that in 1967 there was much optimism in the two rival leagues which preceded the NASL, as up to that time soccer had never had enough money behind it for adequate promotion or presentation to an American audience. CBS television had an initial contract with the National Professional Soccer League (NPSL) in 1967. However, the standard of play was relatively poor at the outset and Danny Blanchflower, the analyst for CBS, had no hesitation in telling his viewers that what they were watching was of comparatively poor quality. Blanchflower(1968) claimed at the end of the

season that he was justified in not enthusing over the play as other commentators did, as he considered that Americans needed educating and told good from bad. He also observed that few team owners had any real love for soccer. The TV companies, as co-promoters had to sell the product to the sponsors and viewers. In the first televised game between two American teams, the Baltimore Bays played the Atlanta Chiefs. The problem was that soccer's uninterupted flow was inconducive to commercial breaks, which are the lifeblood of any television company. So, to cater for this, pauses in the game were designed by players feigning injuries so that commercials could be inserted! Blanchflower eloquently concluded that 'Sport is a wonderfully democratic thing, one of the few battlefields left... They (sports) do not belong to owners of athletic franchises or to TV companies. They belong to the people.'

Unfortunately, this idealistic viewpoint is an anachronism in view of the role TV plays in sports events today. Reed(1980)reported that National Football League(NFL) teams received $5.3 million each from television contracts before they even took the field. With money like that available, TV becomes a dictator rather than a tool of a sport. The NFL is perhaps an exception however when compared to the NASL's TV contract in 1980 which netted each team a mere $27,000. As Reed says, 'The NASL has always drooled at the bounty that

comes with being an established major sport... but the rainbow seems to be a little longer now, the pot farther away'. The situation any soccer league is faced with is convincing the TV companies that there is enough of an audience already there to make it worthwhile screening games.

The Future

Possible explanations for the game's lack of success have been analysed and seem to paint a gloomy picture. Several factors need to be considered however, in order to show that a league does have a future if certain guidelines are followed.

Reed(1977) claims that soccer is a 'now' sport if one accepts that sports must follow peoples' moods not create them. The game is attracting the young rebelious people of the 1960s and people can identify with the creativity and the normal sized participants. In addition it is relatively cheap to play.

At the college level, soccer is the fastest growing sport, with the number of college teams rising from 223 in 1977 to 544 in 1985. If recent growth rates continue, then in a few years time soccer will be played by more college aged youths during summer than baseball. At the youth level more than 1 million youngsters from kindergarten through college are caught up in the soccer boom.

All these points indicate that at the participation level at least, soccer is on the increase and so it would seem that at some stage the hierarchy is going to be completed. Television is probably the most important factor involved in sports franchise location today. That there is little TV company interest in soccer means that attendance is presently the most important variable dictating professional soccer's success. Consequently it is of paramount importance to maximize attendance, perhaps also proving to T.V companies that there is an audience, and so suitable franchise locations need to be chosen.

Lowe and Harold(1972) conducted a survey to range the relative importance of the factors attracting college students to sports events. They concluded that the most important factor determining attendance was the popularity of or interest in a sport. This has been shown to exhibit regional variation.

Study Objectives

The NASL exhibited an unstable structure in terms of the location of its franchises. Many new locations, relocations and changes in the league's composition had occured. This indicates that a state of spatial flux existed whereby an equilibrium between demand and supply had not yet been resolved.

Consequently, this thesis has two objectives:

i) To briefly examine the locational changes made by the NASL in the light of other professional sports leagues.

ii) As there is relatively little T.V interest in soccer, attendance must be maximized. Thus optimum locations need to be identified in order to build the foundations of a successful league. This will be done by taking variables thought to be related to soccer interest and then combining these to give an index for each state and county. A simple model will then be utilized to assess different areas to ascertain how conducive they would be to a professional soccer franchise.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Academic works pertaining to sport in general and soccer in particular are not very common. The study of sport has been a neglected field perhaps due to its embryonic nature. Despite isolated studies, the sub-discipline has only recently attained academic legitimacy with the publication of Rooney's A Geography of American Sport in 1974. Studies of soccer in a geographical context, or in any context for that matter, are even more sparse.

Bale(1981) in his definitive work on the geography of sport in Britain claims that there are barriers to the adoption of certain 'minority' sports. This theory can be applied to soccer in the US where competition with established sports has proved to be a substantial barrier to the widespread acceptance of the game. Additionally, Americans know little about the game and so need more exposure to it before they will 'adopt' it on a large scale.

Petrie(1975) considers that prestige and status can be achieved through success in sport. Soccer is a game that would provide the US with a chance to compete with the rest of the world in a team sport that is

internationally recognized as oppossed to the more provincial sports of football and baseball. To do this however, some sort of infrastructure must be present to provide the national team with its players. Thus a thriving professional league is almost essential to achieve this goal.

Rooney(1975) claims that when a sport becomes 'established' or 'accepted' then regionalization takes place, whereby different areas have a different degree of emphasis. However, it may be argued that any sport will exhibit regional variety of interest and thus soccer must show some spatial variety in degree of emphasis whether one considers it to be established or not. Therefore if one can identify features which are indicative of interest in soccer, then ideal areas for franchise locations can be predicted.

A successful league would be very lucrative financially as Mcpherson (1975) contends, but more work needs to be carried out on the motivation of spectators. As one of the most important prerequisite for the establishment of a professional sport, spectators are a very significant consideration.

According to Lowe and Harold(1972) there is much more indirect than direct consumption of a sport. Direct consumption is essentially participation and spectating, whereas indirect consumption is exposure to the various media. This is perhaps not surprising considering that

less effort is required to consume indirectly - there is no travelling to stadia, braving adverse weather conditions or making a substantial financial outlay. Thus to induce someone to pay to watch a sport, requires stimulation of that person in some way. Presumably the more interested a person is in that particular sport then in theory the easier it will be to persaude him to spectate. Thus, finding the areas where people are more interested in soccer is of paramount importance in identifying optimum areas for franchise locations.

Rooney(1975) attempted to locate franchises according to TV market areas using what was essentially a population based model. It was assumed however, that interest was uniform, while in reality of course, interest will vary for different sports and so the optimum locations will also be different for different sports. Thus any model to predict franchise locations must take into account interest levels specific to that sport

Dunning(1969) has hypothesised that in Britain attendance at soccer games is a means of compensating for the boredom of work. Loy(1968) claims that a sports fan has a high personal level of investment and commitment. This can be contrasted with the spectator who is not especially interested in the sport itself. For instance, horse racing has the highest aggregate spectator attendance in the United States but is probably more attractive for the gambling associated with it rather than

its spectacle. Other spectators enjoy the social experience of being with their friends or just being part of the event's atmosphere. Being part of a crowd has been shown to engender a feeling of belonging and identification. This feeling is probably heightened when the spectator is watching a team sport such as college football, which stimulates an empathy with the local community.

It has been hypothesised that certain events or periods of time can provide the stimulus for a 'spectator explosion'. Arum and King(1984) argue that Muhamed Ali's appearance on the boxing scene, increased boxing's popularity. In the case of soccer, Harvey(1975) cites Pele's appearance for the New York Cosmos in the NASL as the main reason for the game's increased popularity which was reflected in attendance and participation increases. This popularity can clearly ebb and flow and thus one of the aims of a professional soccer league, in the light of the subsequent decline in popularity of the NASL, must be to ensure that any future interest is sustained.

Mcpherson(1972) has stated that the degree of consumption of a sport is directly related to such things as the importance of a sport to one's parents, the amount of primary sports involvement, the opportunity to engage in a sport as a participant and the number of 'significant others' that consume a sport. Kenyon and Mcpherson(1973) also contend that one of the major factors concerned is

primary sport involvement. Thus, the person who actually participates in a sport, especially at a young age, is more likely to consume a sport as a spectator and at more frequent intervals.

The least important factors were not related directly to the sport itself but to the infrastructure. The current trend is for major facilities to be constructed by the city, county or regional governments because of the great cost involved. There is great competition between major cities to attract professional teams; a professional franchise provides that area with a certain status and this 'national' image in turn encourages industry, business and tourist activities. Noll(1972) says that to qualify as a city an area must have 'an orchestra, a large library, a system of parks, a transportation system, a university and a public stadium in which to gather and a professional team to play there'. Thus an elaborate stadium must be offered as bait to team owners and nowadays these come equipped with cushioned seats, an artificial playing surface, restaurants and cafeterias, private suites, extensive car parks and giant TV screens.

To the spectator, a parity has been reached whereby all stadia offer virtually the same facilities so this should have little bearing on whether people can be attracted or not. However, the franchise owner might consider that a lack of facilities constitutes a less advantageous site. This can be seen in the case of the

NFL Raider's move from Oakland to Los Angeles because the Oakland Coliseum lacked the potential revenue making luxury boxes.

There has been a relatively large amount of work undertaken on the factors affecting attendance at sporting events, but it must be remembered that these are for so called established sports.

Quirk and El Hodiri(1974) developed a model which assumed that the higher the drawing potential of a franchise then 'the greater the gate receipts associated with every level of profitability of the home team's winning'. The pertinent conclusions arrived at were that an area's drawing potential was proportional to a team's strength in the long run. Share of gate receipts are significant as the higher the home team's share then the more revenue depends upon success at home games. Thus the larger this proportion is, the less chance small city franchises have for survival. The model proved a strong positive correlation between population and won-lost record indicating that a small city franchise will find it more difficult to attain playing success.

Noll(1974) observes that 'A list of factors (that) influence attendance at professional sports contests is not difficult to assemble. Fans presumably prefer good to poor games, skillful to unskillful players and a winning to a losing home team...variations in team quality, prices and other demand related factors should produce greater

variation in larger cities'. It was concluded that baseball was a working class sport and that hometown population was crucial. For example, in order to draw 1 million fans, an average team would have to have a metro population of 1.9 million. This was believed to be related to playing success and it was observed that in only six SMSA's - New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia and Boston - will a consistent loser draw 1 million fans each year. A New York team would gain over 500,000 fans with the addition of a star player, while a city of 1.5 million would add about 65,000. Interestingly, an area with a large black population was shown to lead to lower attendance. This was considered due to less interest in attending baseball games, white racism and the tendency of cities with large black populations to have a lower quality stadium in an unattractive, relatively inaccessible area. The main conclusion reached was that very few additional cities could support a baseball team. Conversely, football has an 'obvious excess demand for its product' as most games were sold out.

A survey of ice hockey teams showed that the club would attract more fans if the franchise were located on the Canadian side of the border. Jones, in a study on ice hockey franchise locations, determined that Saskatoon would be a good location despite its small metropolitan population. This was found to be due to minimal

competition with alternative forms of entertainment, a large affluent hinterland population and, most significantly, a high fan interest level.

Chandler(1978) claims that not all sports are interesting on TV. He says that to succeed a sport must be dramatic which is an element that is not transferable beyond the stadia in soccer. Soccer is unpredictable and spontaneous, does not lend itself to the statistics loved by Americans and lacks the legitimized violence that is football. Consequently it is relatively poor TV entertainment. The implication is that if soccer cannot succeed on TV then it will never succeed as a spectator sport because of the limited amount of income from the TV companies. Michener(1976) reiterates this point when he implies that soccer and ice hockey are a dissapointment on television and are destined to be 'grand opera sports: something not for the lay multitude but for the perpetual joy of the connoisseur'. Michener claims that television plays a major role in determining where a franchise can be profitably placed and suggests that basketball cannot survive on T.V if the two main markets (New York and Los Angeles) field bad teams. The success of a professional team depends primarily however on the coverage it gets free in newspapers. Constant favourable mentions are better than paid advertising, radio or television.

Thornes(1983) has suggested that the effect of weather on sports is considerable. Weather variables have

been utilized to assess their effect on attendance at sporting events in Britain but it was concluded that more research is needed to make any firm conclusions. Again, this might have implications pertaining to soccer. It is arguably more difficult to play good quality soccer in hot, humid conditions than it is in areas with more temperate climates. Consequently, the game's attractive powers are partially eroded in North America, as professional soccer leagues have always chosen to play in the hot summer months. This is because unlike gridiron football, with its short periods of activity interspersed with longer periods of inactivity, soccer is a game that requires almost continual movement for 90 minutes. Teams that play in hot, humid climates, including most Latin Americans, have adapted their style of play to conserve energy while concentrating on ball skills.

It has been argued that artificial turf which many of the stadia have, detracts from the quality of play in soccer. This is because the surface is much 'faster' than grass and thus the ball is more difficult to control. Consequently,the quality of entertainment offered is lower and could therefore be a major factor contributing to small attendance.

Rooney and Johnson(1983) claim that at the collegiate level soccer is merely a concession to foreign students. It was hypothesised that for soccer to gain national recognition it must be 'accepted at the high school level'

as this is an indication of community interest. They observed that soccer 'originated' in the north eastern United States, then spread to California with the interior parts of the continent being slower to 'adopt'. One of the main factors assumed to be responsible for this pattern was the degree of ethnicity of an area. There was found to be a correlation between a high percentage of foreign stock and a large number of schools playing soccer. This is not suprising as soccer is the most important game in a majority of the world's countries, especially Europe. Thus, there is a possibility that the demand to play (and presumably to watch) soccer is going to be higher in areas where there are many 'foreigners'.

If soccer can overcome the barriers to its establishment then it can provide the US with a national team to compete on an international scale. This requires a professional league which would benefit from stable franchise locations. Perhaps the example of ice hockey holds the key; a sport which can also be considered 'imported' and has a rather esoteric following. Correspondingly, the National Hockey League(NHL) does not have a major TV contract and thus it must be assumed that franchise locations have been chosen which are related to local levels of interest rather than the lure of the dollar - American or Canadian! This seems to be the case as many of the locations are in areas with relatively small populations. Thus soccer franchises should also be located in areas with suitable levels of interest.

CHAPTER III

SPORTS FRANCHISE LOCATIONS

A professional sports franchise is essentially a high order service, in the context of Christaller's central place theory. The service is only provided at certain times (much more frequently in the case of baseball than football) and because of its cost, needs a large threshold population in order to sustain its viability. Depending on the perceived quality of the service offered the consumer will be prepared to travel a maximum distance or range to obtain that service. The range will also vary according to the consumer's location. In an area where the consumer has a large choice of services (in the North Eastern United States for example) the range will probably be smaller. In a more remote area of the country however, the consumer might be willing to travel further to obtain the service desired.

Ted Howard(1986) Executive Director of League Operations in the NASL, claimed in a personal interview that many NASL owners were involved because of the relative cheapness of acquiring a soccer franchise and the status that went with it. However, with the change in tax law, the incentive to sell the franchise at the end of five or eight years was reduced, leading to more stability

and more of the kind of owners who are interested in the welfare of the sport.

The next question is where and why are franchises located? The ideal location would be to locate in an area where a large audience was guaranteed for every game. However, as Noll(1974) points out, the reason usually given as to why a team makes financial losses is that there is not enough support. If this were the case then only the largest cities would have a sufficient pool of fans. Demmert(1973) has examined the spatial pattern of professional sport and comes to the conclusion that the size (population) of a city is crucial to the success of any franchise. According to Loy(1973) the movement of a marginal franchise only serves to create another marginal franchise. An imbalance is inherent in the system because adding a star player, for example, to a big city team can add more to its revenue than can be earned by a small city team. Consequently, the big city team can afford to pay the small city team for its best players and this occurs despite the reserve clause which was designed to prohibit this by giving owners first refusal on a player's contract.

Quirk(1973) claims that more often than not franchises are moved because they can generate greater income elsewhere and thus franchise moves permit small city franchises to make short term profits. The implication of this is that some franchises are never

going to make long run profits, which in turn suggests that the optimum size of a professional sports league can be determined with the elimination of marginal franchises.

There is a possibility however, that too much emphasis has been placed on large cities as the obvious location choices for franchises. There might be some smaller centers which are more amenable but have not been taken into consideration because of their relatively small populations. The rationale behind the location of a franchise in a 'big city' is that access to a large population will mean the potential is there to attract a large 'live' audience or a large television audience. College sport has evolved to provide sport in areas where professional teams will not locate because of the financial risks involved. This might explain, for example, the significance of Nebraska college football and Kentucky college basketball. In some areas, where the population is sufficiently large, professional and college sport can coexist such as at UCLA and the University of Michigan.

This is essentially an application of central place theory. Professional sports franchises can be considered 'high order' centers and consequently will have large threshold populations. More importantly, the range or distance that people are prepared to travel to obtain a service provided by a center, will be larger. Additionally, a central location while not having a large

population itself, might act as a focus for a much larger area. The example of Green Bay, Wisconsin with a population of 146,000, although an exception, is an indication that a smaller city can accomodate a professional sports team. Other smaller city examples can be seen in the National Hockey League, where Calgary, Edmonton, Quebec and Winnipeg all have populations less than 500,000 and yet possess NHL franchises.

However, Michener(1976) suggests that television potential is more important than population. Horowitz(1974) states that 'Because broadcast rights have become an important source of revenues, they must play an important role in the financial planning of a franchise'. Few teams are profitable without broadcast revenues (and many are not even profitable with them!) Howard(1986) observed that the two most important factors in locating a soccer franchise were the size of the market and the TV potential.

The area of dominant influence(ADI) allocates every county in the United States to a metro area which dominates its television viewing habits. Consequently, each city can be ranked according to the size of its T.V market. This can be seen in Table I. Michener(1976) cites the case of Baltimore, which has one of the largest population bases in the country and yet represents a 'dubious sports market'. This is attributed to T.V viewers being siphoned off to Washington D.C in the south

TABLE I

THE INFLUENCE OF TELEVISION ON FRANCHISE LOCATIONS

1970 Rank	Area	1970 Population ,000s	Rank ADI 1970
1.	New York	11529	1
2.	Los Angeles	7032	2
3.	Chicago	6979	3
4.	Philadelphia	4818	4
5.	Detroit	4200	7
6.	San Francisco/Oakland	3110	6
7.	Washington, D.C	2861	9
8.	Boston	2754	5
9.	Pittsburgh	2401	10
10.	St Louis	2363	12
11.	Dallas/Fort Worth	2318	11
12.	Baltimore	2071	19
13.	Cleveland	2064	8
14.	Houston	1985	14
15.	Minneapolis/St Paul	1814	13
16.	Seattle	1422	15
17.	Milwaukee	1404	26
18.	Atlanta	1390	16
19.	Cincinnati	1385	23
20.	San Diego	1358	34
21.	Buffalo	1349	24
22.	Miami	1268	18
23.	Kansas City	1254	22
24.	Denver	1228	28
25.	Indianapolis	1110	17
26.	New Orleans	1046	36
27.	Tampa	1013	20
28.	Portland	1009	25

Source: Adapted From Michener(1976)

and Philadelphia to the north and thus it has an ADI ranking lower than its population rank. Conversely, Tampa appears not to have the population potential to support a franchise and yet its ADI ranking suggests a large T.V population. Consequently, it can be assumed that franchise locations and relocations, in 'established' sports at least, are dictated not by fan support but by TV revenues.

Major Sport Locations

Hockey is not considered in the following evaluation because to a certain extent it has the same characteristics as soccer; that is a sport that is not established. In addition, Canada is not considered because subsequent data is restricted to the United States.

If one considers the location of professional sports franchises in 1957 (fig 2), a clear North Eastern and Mid Western bias can be seen (although there were two NFL franchises in California). They were also concentrated in the larger cities as evidenced by the six franchises in New York, five in Chicago and four in Detroit. The rest of the country was a void as far as professional sports were concerned.

This 'big city' pattern is duplicated in 1985 but the major change is that franchises are found in most parts of the country. As the number of franchises increased, the



Figure 2. The Location of Professional Sports Franchises 1957 and 1985

North East and Mid West were exhausted of potential locations and thus the inevitable search for sites further afield took place. The most significant additions are to be found in the deep south and Texas and along the west coast. Los Angeles and the Bay area of California have become almost as important as New York in terms of the number of franchises and the Texan cities of Dallas and Houston also occupy prominent positions.

Baseball seems to be the most spatially restricted of all the sports as, aside from the league's expansion to the west coast and a foray into East Texas and Atlanta many potential markets have remained unexplored. Conversely, Football seems to have been the most ubiquitous colonizer and can almost be considered the only sport to be represented as a major professional sport in the Deep South.

The NBA has been the most adventurous of the leagues(although it might be more than coincidence that it is also the least profitable!) Sites have been chosen which many would not consider to be 'major league cities'. Salt Lake City, Phoenix and Indianapolis are good examples.

If one considers fig 3 showing post war locational changes in the main sports leagues, some patterns can be seen. Major League Baseball shows a clearly defined westward movement while the NBA and NFL do also, although to a lesser extent. Looking at the table of franchise



Figure 3. Franchise Location Changes in Major League Baseball, National Basketball Association and The National Football League

location changes(table II), this pattern can also be discerned. For example, if the franchise additions to a city are compared with a city's losses, then in the case of New York the net result is one more franchise gained than lost, while in the case of Los Angeles there have been eight additions and only three losses. Baltimore also shows a net gain of franchises, as do San Diego and Seattle for example while on the other hand Chicago, Boston and Kansas City all show a net loss. Clearly this is a rudimentary form of analysis, however it does shed some light on locational changes.

Perhaps because of the lack of a lucrative TV contract, the NASL appears to have made many 'hit and miss' attempts to find viable locations. If one examines figure 4 a pattern is not clearly discernable although there does seem to be some kind of westward expansion away from the North East. In considering cities that have had an NASL franchise only to see it relocate or fold, Washington DC has had four different franchises and Boston has had three. Both these cities would seem ideal sites as both have fielded NFL and NBA teams(Boston also has a major league baseball and a NHL team). Bad management could have been a reason for the franchise's failure or it could have been that the sport market was already saturated. It must be remembered therefore, that a site that seems conducive to any type of franchise may not prove viable because of bad management. Essentially this

TABLE II

FRANCHISE LOCATION CHANGES IN PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL, BASKETBALL AND BASEBALL BY CITY 1945-85

	Expansions	Losses From	Losses To	Moved	Total Changes
New York	7	3	4	1	15
Los Angeles	4	2	1	4	11
Baltimore	4	3	1	3	11
Chicago	3	2	2	0	7
San Diego	3	1	1	2	7
Boston	2	2	2	0	6
Buffalo	3	2	1	0	6
Dallas	3	1	2	0	6
Kansas City	2	1	1	2	6
Oakland	3	1	1	1	6
Cincinnati	2	1	1	1	5
Miami	2	2	1	0	5
Milwaukee	1	0	2	2	5
St Louis	1	1	2	1	5
Denver	2	2	0	0	4
Houston	2	1	0	1	4
Indianapolis	2	1	0	1	4
Minneapolis	1	0	1	2	4
Seattle	3	0	1	0	4
Atlanta	1	0	1	2	4
Cleveland	2	0	1	0	3
New Orleans	2	0	1	0	3
Philadelphia	0	0	2	1	3
San Francisco	0	0	0	2	2
Total	55	26	28	26	135



Figure 4. Franchise Location Changes in the North American Soccer League 1968-85

means that management can make or break a franchise whatever its potential. Unfortunately, this can be considered an intangible factor and so a franchise that fails ostensibly through low attendance might be located in a perfect site but badly managed. The converse might also be true; a franchise might survive for a long time in a bad location because of good management. It is also possible however that in the case of Boston and DC, soccer interest in these areas was not high enough and so perhaps alternative locations would have been more desirable. Fig 5 shows all the locations that have ever been chosen by the NASL and reveals some interesting choices. They have perhaps not been constrained by the TV companies to such an extent as the 'established' leagues. Table III indicates which locations could be considered the more 'succesful' in the NASL as it shows the cities which had a franchise for the most consecutive years.

Many reasons have been attributed to the NASL's collapse. Although TV is considered the primary locational factor concerning sports franchises the NASL proved to be an exception. The NHL has tended to locate its franchises in areas with a high interest in hockey. Thus many of the sites have relatively small populations. A new soccer league could be started by locating teams in areas which will be genuinely interested in supporting a professional franchise. The following analysis will determine these optimum locations.



Figure 5. Franchise Locations Chosen by the NASL

TABLE III

MOST SUCCESFUL NORTH AMERICAN SOCCER LEAGUE FRANCHISES

City	Consecutive Years
New York/Jersey City	14
Miami	12
Dallas	12
Rochester	11
San Jose	11
Tampa/St Petersburg	10
Seattle	10
Chicago	10
Portland	8
St Louis	9

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

The main data base used was a sample of all NCAA division I schools which had soccer programs in 1985. Each school was contacted and asked to provide a team roster. Of the I87 Division 1 schools taking part in the 1985 season, 150 responded which is an 80% sample of Division I schools. The location of the schools sampled relative to the parent population is shown in fig 6. Each player's place of origin was recorded. The assumption is that the more players that come from a certain area, then the greater the interest in soccer in that area. With a sample this size (nearly 3,500 soccer players) the likelihood that chance is involved in the distribution is small. Thus if an area produces many players, this is probably due to good high school programs in the area, good coaching, good facilities or other similar factors; that is, a high level of interest in soccer. Correspondingly, this area might also be conducive to locating a professional franchise given the local emphasis. The assumption made here is that if interest in general is high then so will be the desire to spectate. At the very least, propensity to spectate will be higher than in an area with a lower level of interest.



Figure 6. NCAA Division 1 Schools Playing Soccer in 1985

One would expect more absolute production or programs in areas with large populations. So Los Angeles and New York for example are going to figure high in absolute terms whatever the variables. Location quotients are used to compare certain variables against an average of 1.00. Thus in the case of soccer players the national average is one player produced for every 77,584 of the 1981 population. So an area producing 1 player per 155,168 would be producing at 0.5 times the national average. Similarly an area that produces 1 player per 38,792 would have a location quotient of 2.00. Thus as Rooney has suggested, absolute production can be misleading and so the data have been converted to per capita indices.

Division 1 schools were chosen because to reach that level of competition there must generally be an extra stimulus in the environment, if one accepts that potential talent is ubiquitously distributed. The quality of players in Division II or III will generally be lower and so the quality of coaching or facilities for example in the player's hometown will not be as high ceteris paribus.

It was debated as to whether hometown or high school attended were a more appropriate measure. There is perhaps a danger in taking a person's hometown as his assumed area of experience as he might have lived most of his life elsewhere. Similarly, the high school attended might only have been the most recent one. It was decided that cases such as these would be in the minority and thus could be ignored, so the hometown was used.

It was decided that for the purposes of this study a player's college destination, as opposed to place of origin, was of little importance for two reasons. Firstly, soccer is not a big income sport and receives relatively little media attention. Consequently the emphasis placed on luring the best athletes with the kind of incentives which are common in football and basketball will probably not occur at the vast majority of colleges. Thus it is quite likely that a school is chosen by the player more for its academic facilities than its soccer program - especially at the non scholarship schools. Secondly, it is difficult to determine local interest from a player's migratory behavior. It is possible that a program is attracting many players from outside its immediate catchment area because local interest is low. Conversely a program that consists of mainly local talent is analagous to the non athletic situation where a student attends a local college because of its proximity. So one cannot assume that high local attraction means high local interest in itself. Thus one must not be oblivious to the implications of any student or student/athlete migration.

The availability of college soccer programs was also considered an important factor. If a state has ten college programs while another state with a similar population only has two programs, then the first state must have a greater interest in soccer. The assumption here is that a college program is a response to a local

demand. The predominant program is that of a Division III school. This implies that soccer is more likely to be offered by smaller schools which is perhaps because of the relative cheapness of setting up a soccer program as opposed to a football program for example. Five hundred and forty three NCAA colleges had soccer programs in 1984-85. If one assumes that interest in soccer is uniform throughout the country then these soccer offering colleges will be located relative to the nation's population. If as is more likely however, interest varies regionally, then the college locations will reflect this emphasis. Thus a per capita index was again formulated. It is possible that this index is too population sensitive however and so a second college index was derived. This took the percentage of all (NCAA and NAIA) schools in each state which had soccer programs.

The problem with any areal delimitation is that political boundaries are essentially arbitrary. Additionally, aggregating data into large areal units hides detail. Thus to say that the United States contains nearly a quarter of a billion people says nothing about the distribution. Similarly, at the state level in the context of soccer interest, there might be a high overall interest which is merely the result of exceptional interest in one or two centers. The problem regards the level of resolution. Is the county level too high, the city level too small? Thus, two tiers of analysis will be

used. The state level of generalization will be assessed first, followed by the county level, while identifying the major cities and/or SMSA's within the particular counties.

Participation in soccer was a factor considered to be of importance. The USSF furnished data indicating the number of registered youth and adult participants for each state. Presumably, the greater the participation then the greater the likelihood to spectate. The USSF is a nationally recognized organization. The majority of the players in the United States are members although there are other minor associations.

Some conceptual considerations must be taken into account when trying to locate a professional sports franchise. Location quotients indicate interest or emphasis compared to a national norm but a franchise located in an area of above average interest but with a relatively small base population is unlikely to succeed. Thus one must assume a minimum base population for a franchise to survive.

Once the high ranking states were determined, the county level was assessed to deduce more specific locations. Player production data were the only type available at this scale. They gave an indication of which cities would be good potential locations.

A technique to determine potential audience is to assume that a standard proportion of people in a given population will be interested in soccer. American

Demographics conducted a survey in February 1987 which revealed that 5% of the American public watched soccer on T.V. Thus 5% is the arbitrary figure used in this study. This percentage is then multiplied by the location quotient of the area to give a soccer interest multiplier. The multiplier is then affected on the population of the relevant city to give a potential spectator pool. The base population is derived by aggregating the populations of the counties bordering on the relevant city. Of this pool, the majority will be floating supporters who will see very few games, but presumably a larger pool will have a larger core of potential dedicated supporters. This technique will be performed on all the cities under consideration and these cities will then be ranked in order to deduce the more desirable locations.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

State Indices of Interest

In the case of the total number of college players produced, one can see from Table IV that, as one would expect, there is a correlation between population size and the number of players produced. Of the top ten producing states seven are among the ten most populous states. New York easily produces the most players but this needs to be reconciled with the fact that the state also has the most Division 1 college programs represented in the sample. Interestingly, the next highest producing 'region' would be the 339 players from abroad, a group which figure low in football, basketball and baseball production. This re-emphasizes the claim that soccer is an imported sport! The three states which are not among the ten most populous are Missouri, Virginia and Maryland. However, they are all in the top 20 states by population.

At the bottom end of Table IV six states do not produce any players at all. Alaska, Montana, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming are the states which fall into this category. Vermont is perhaps the biggest surprise, as it is situated in the North Eastern/New

TABLE IV

RANKED STATE PRODUCTION OF
COLLEGE SOCCER PLAYERS

Rank	State	Players Produced	Rank	State	Players Produced
1.	New York	379	27.	Colorado	14
2.	New Jersey	280	28.	Oklahoma	12
3.	California	202	29.	Oregon	11
4.	Pennsylvania	201	30.	South Carolina	11
5.	Illinois	176	31.	Kansas	10
6.	Missouri	158	32.	Alabama	9
7.	Virginia	151	33.	Maine	8
8.	Ohio	133	34.	Hawaii	7
9.	Maryland	130	35.	Nevada	7
10.	Florida	118	36.	Mississippi	5
11.	Texas	113	37.	Nebraska	5
12.	Connecticut	107	38.	Idaho	4
13.	Massachusetts	101	39.	Arizona	3
14.	Michigan	88	40.	D.C	3
15.	North Carolina	67	41.	New Mexico	3
16.	Wisconsin	67	42.	Arkansas	2
17.	Washington	63	43.	Iowa	2
18.	Georgia	50	44.	North Dakota	1
19.	Tennessee	47	45.	West Virginia	1
20.	Kentucky	43	46.	Alaska	0
21.	Indiana	36	47.	Montana	0
22.	Louisiana	22	48.	South Dakota	0
23.	Minnesota	20	49.	Utah	0
24.	Delaware	17	50.	Vermont	0
25.	Rhode Island	17	51.	Wyoming	0
26.	New Hampshire	16			
	Foreign Players	339			

England portion of the country where one would expect at least some production. West Virginia and Washington D.C are the other states which one would expect to be more prominent and yet produced only one and three players respectively.

Table V shows each state ranked by the index of player production. Fourteen states have above average production of college soccer players and of these there is a clear demarcation between six states with more than twice the national average and the eight with between 1 and 1.70. On observing fig 7, the most obvious distinction is a North Eastern bias although Missouri is an exception to the Atlantic seaboard rule. It has the third highest ranking of 2.47 but this is slightly misleading as of the 157 players produced by the state of Missouri, 111 come from St Louis. So in this respect, it would be misleading to say that Missouri as a whole has a high degree of emphasis on soccer. Of the rest of the states with above average production, five are in the New England/North Eastern region, the lone Western representative is Washington, while Wisconsin and Illinois champion the Mid West.

The absolute number of NCAA college programs shows a similar pattern to that of player production. The most populous states again have the highest rankings indicating that the number of programs is a response firstly to population (Table VI). Table VII ranks the states by the

TABLE V

RANKED PLAYER PRODUCTION INDICES

Rank	State	Index	Rank	State	Index
1.	New Jersey	2.94	27.	Indiana	0.50
2.	Connecticut	2.67	28.	Louisiana	0.40
3.	Missouri	2.49	29.	Minnesota	0.38
4.	Maryland	2.39	30.	Colorado	0.37
5.	Delaware	2.21	31.	D.C	0.36
6.	Virginia	2.19	32.	Idaho	0.32
7.	New York	1.67	33.	Kansas	0.32
8.	Rhode Island	1.39	34.	Oregon	0.32
9.	Massachusetts	1.36	35.	Oklahoma	0.30
10.	New Hampshire	1.34	36.	South Carolina	0.27
11.	Pennsylvania	1.31	37.	Nebraska	0.24
12.	Illinois	1.19	38.	Alabama	0.17
13.	Washington	1.18	39.	New Mexico	0.17
14.	Wisconsin	1.10	40.	Mississippi	o.15
15.	Ohio	0.95	41.	North Dakota	0.11
16.	Florida	0.93	42.	Arizona	0.08
17.	Kentucky	0.91	43.	Arkansas	0.06
18.	North Carolina	0.88	44.	Iowa	0.05
19.	Tennessee	0.79	45.	West Virginia	0.03
20.	Michigan	0.73	46.	Alaska	0.00
21.	Georgia	0.71	47.	Montana	0.00
22.	Nevada	0.67	48.	South Dakota	0.00
23.	California	0.66	49.	Utah	0.00
24.	Texas	0.61	50.	Vermont	0.00
25.	Hawaii	0.56	51.	Wyoming	0.00
26.	Maine	0.55			



Number of Soccer Players



Player Production Index

Figure 7. Soccer Player Production

TABLE VI

RANKED STATE PROVISION OF NCAA
COLLEGE SOCCER PROGRAMS

Rank	State	College Programs	Rank	State	College Programs
1.	New York	75	27.	Colorado	6
2.	Pennsylvania	58	28.	South Carolina	5
3.	California	43	29.	Washington	5
4.	Massachusetts	38	30.	West Virginia	5
5.	Ohio	28	31.	Alabama	4
6.	Illinois	25	32.	Iowa	4
7.	Virginia	23	33.	Louisiana	4
8.	New Jersey	22	34.	Mississippi	2
9.	North Carolina	18	35.	Oregon	2
10.	Connecticut	16	36.	Delaware	1
11.	Florida	14	37.	Nebraska	1
12.	Maryland	14	38.	Nevada	1
13.	Indiana	13	39.	New Mexico	1
14.	Wisconsin	13	40.	Oklahoma	1
15.	Michigan	12	41.	Utah	1
16.	Minnesota	11	42.	Alaska	0
17.	Kentucky	10	43.	Arizona	0
18.	Maine	9	44.	Arkansas	0
19.	Texas	9	45.	Hawaii	0
20.	Missouri	8	46.	Idaho	0
21.	Tennessee	8	47.	Kansas	0
22.	D.C	7	48.	Montana	0
23.	Georgia	7	49.	North Dakota	0
24.	New Hampshire	7	50.	South Dakota	0
25.	Rhode Island	7	51.	Wyoming	0
26.	Vermont	7			

TABLE VII

RANKED NCAA SOCCER PROGRAM INDEX

Rank	State	Index	Rank	State	Index
1.	Vermont	5.74	27.	Florida	0.60
2.	D.C	4.60	28.	Iowa	0.57
3.	Maine	3.35	29.	Michigan	0.54
4.	New Hampshire	3.18	30.	Georgia	0.53
5.	Rhode Island	3.10	31.	Nevada	0.52
6.	Massachusetts	2.77	32.	Washington	0.50
7.	Connecticut	2.16	33.	Alabama	0.43
8.	Pennsylvania	2.05	34.	Louisiana	0.39
9.	Virginia	1.80	35.	Mississippi	0.33
10.	New York	1.79	36.	New Mexico	0.32
11.	Maryland	1.39	37.	Oregon	0.31
12.	North Carolina	1.28	38.	Utah	0.28
13.	New Jersey	1.25	39.	Nebraska	0.26
14.	Wisconsin	1.15	40.	Texas	0.26
15.	Kentucky	1.14	41.	Oklahoma	0.13
16.	Minnesota	1.13	42.	Alaska	0.00
17.	Ohio	1.08	43.	Arizona	0.00
18.	West Virginia	1.07	44.	Arkansas	0.00
19.	Indiana	0.99	45.	Hawaii	0.00
20.	Illinois	0.91	46.	Idaho	0.00
21.	Colorado	0.87	47.	Kansas	0.00
22.	California	0.76	48.	Montana	0.00
23.	Tennessee	0.73	49.	North Dakota	0.00
24.	Delaware	0.70	50.	South Dakota	0.00
25.	Missouri	0.68	51.	Wyoming	0.00
26.	South Carolina	0.67			

NCAA college programs index. One can see that only eighteen states are providing an above average rate. Ten states do not provide any programs at all. Of the top 13 states all are in the North East/New England portion of the country(figure 8). Surprisingly, Vermont is the best provided for state in the country in terms of college programs despite producing no players itself! This could be due to there being only one Division 1 school in Vermont, which did not provide a roster for the survey and was thus not represented in the sample. However, one would still expect some players from Vermont to go to the numerous other schools playing soccer in the area. Similarly with Washington D.C; a very high ranking and high program index and yet only three players had their origins there. One explanation here could be that the District of Columbia's programs attract people from a large hinterland and thus are not just a response to the immediate surrounding area but to a larger area outside this. Similarly, the administrative region of D.C is relatively small and so there are probably many players who come from just outside the district but are considered part of Maryland or Virginia's production.

The next group of states can be considered Mid Western (excluding West Virginia). Wisconsin, Kentucky, Minnesota, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois all have high quotients although Illinois' index of 0.99 is below average. Perhaps the most interesting finding so far is



Number of NCAA Soccer Programs



NCAA College Programs Index

Figure 8. NCAA Soccer Program Provision

that Texas, Florida and California, all states with high populations, do not have high rankings.

The provision of all soccer programs (NCAA and NAIA) shows a similar pattern: the greatest provision generally occuring in the more populous states (fig 9). On a percentage basis, the highest provision occurs in New England and Ohio. The central plain states and the Rockies have the lowest proportions of soccer programs.

Table X shows rankings by youth participation and this time a slightly different pattern emerges. Oklahoma makes a surprise entrance into the top ten, but this apart, the top ten states seem to be again dominated by the more populous. At the other end of the scale however, along with the Dakotas, Montana and Hawaii, are some New England states: Vermont, Delaware, Maine and New Hampshire. Table XI shows a large incongruity. One would expect, given previous findings, above average youth participation in soccer east of the Mississippi, but this is not the case. As can be seen from figure 10, the exceptional states are nearly all to the West of the Mississippi! One possible explanation for this is the fact that participation levels are represented by the number of registered players in the USSF while regional rates of registration differ.

Total participation rates show a similar trend as witnessed in table XII. Total Participation is taken as the sum of all youth and adult players registered with the

TABLE VIII

RANKED STATE PROVISION OF NCAA AND NAIA SOCCER PROGRAMS

Rank	State	Programs	Rank	State	Programs
1.	New York	86	27.	Mississippi	10
2.	Pennsylvania	63	28.	New Hampshire	9
3.	California	53	29.	Vermont	8
4.	Ohio	41	30.	D.C	7
5.	Massachusetts	38	31.	Rhode Island	7
6.	Illinois	35	32.	Colorado	7
7.	North Carolina	29	33.	Alabama	7
8.	New Jersey	24	34.	Iowa	6
9.	Indiana	24	35.	Kansas	6
10.	Virginia	23	36.	Oklahoma	5
11.	Wisconsin	22	37.	Louisiana	4
12.	Florida	20	38.	Nebraska	4
13.	Michigan	18	39.	Delaware	2
14.	Connecticut	16	40.	New Mexico	2
15.	Maryland	15	41.	Nevada	1
16.	Maine	15	42.	Utah	1
17.	South Carolina	15	43.	Arkansas	1
18.	Texas	14	44.	Idaho	1
19.	Missouri	14	45.	Alaska	0
20.	Tennessee	14	46.	Arizona	0
21.	Georgia	14	47.	Hawaii	0
22.	Minnesota	13	48.	Montana	0
23.	Kentucky	11	49.	North Dakota	0
24.	West Virginia	11	50.	South Dakota	0
25.	Oregon	11	51.	Wyoming	0
26.	Washington	10			

TABLE IX

PERCENTAGE OF NCAA AND NAIA SCHOOLS
WITH VARSITY SOCCER PROGRAMS

Rank	State	%	Rank	State	%
1.	Connecticut	100	27.	Minnesota	52
2.	New Jersey	100	28.	Kentucky	50
3.	Rhode Island	100	29.	Nevada	50
4.	Vermont	100	30.	Georgia	48
5.	Maine	93	31.	Michigan	47
6.	Massachusetts	92	32.	Missouri	38
7.	New Hampshire	90	33.	Tennessee	38
8.	New York	88	34.	Alabama	33
9.	Ohio	85	35.	New Mexico	33
10.	California	84	36.	Kansas	28
11.	Maryland	83	37.	Nebraska	28
12.	Pennsylvania	80	38.	Texas	26
13.	D.C	77	39.	Louisiana	25
14.	North Carolina	74	40.	Iowa	22
15.	Wisconsin	73	41.	Oklahoma	21
16.	Mississippi	71	42.	Idaho	16
17.	Washington	71	43.	Utah	16
18.	Illinois	70	44.	Arkansas	6
19.	South Carolina	68	45.	Hawaii	0
20.	Delaware	66	46.	Alaska	0
21.	Indiana	64	47.	Arizona	0
22.	Florida	64	48.	Montana	0
23.	Oregon	61	49.	North Dakota	0
24.	West Virginia	61	50.	South Dakota	0
25.	Virginia	60	51.	Wyoming	0
26.	Colorado	53			



Provision of All Soccer Programs



Percentage of Colleges with Soccer Programs

Figure 9. Total Soccer Program Provision (NCAA and NAIA)

TABLE X

RANKED STATE YOUTH PARTICIPATION

Rank	State	Players	Rank	State	Players
1.	California	183848	27.	Illinois	8156
2.	Texas	132628	28.	Missouri	6840
3.	New York	94273	29.	South Carolina	6725
4.	Washington	73233	30.	Indiana	6696
5.	Pennsylvania	48448	31.	Kentucky	6000
6.	Florida	41600	32.	Kansas	5890
7.	Oklahoma	37918	33.	North Carolina	5487
8.	New Jersey	27420	34.	Idaho	5432
9.	Massachusetts	26921	35.	Alabama	5367
10.	Virginia	26820	36.	Arkansas	5192
11.	Arizona	24016	37.	West Virginia	4643
12.	Georgia	21318	38.	Nevada	4524
13.	Oregon	20190	39.	D.C	3214
14.	Utah	19167	40.	Alaska	3204
15.	Minnesota	18739	41.	Rhode Island	2939
16.	Connecticut	18656	42.	Iowa	2714
17.	Michigan	18414	43.	Wyoming	2576
18.	Colorado	18132	44.	New Hampshire	2434
19.	Maryland	15636	45.	South Dakota	2018
20.	Ohio	14459	46.	Montana	1717
21.	Tennessee	14101	47.	Hawaii	1400
22.	New Mexico	12603	48.	Maine	1200
23.	Louisiana	11617	49.	Delaware	683
24.	Mississipi	10667	50.	Vermont	527
25.	Nebraska	10205	51.	North Dakota	0
26.	Wisconsin	8754			

TABLE XI

STATES RANKED BY THE INDEX OF YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN SOCCER

Rank	State	Index	Rank	State	Index
1.	Washington	3.82	27.	Rhode Island	0.67
2.	Utah	2.83	28.	Tennessee	0.66
3.	Oklahoma	2.70	29.	South Dakota	0.63
4.	New Mexico	2.08	30.	Louisiana	0.59
5.	Texas	2.01	31.	New Hampshire	0.57
6.	Arizona	1.90	32.	Kansas	0.53
7.	Alaska	1.72	33.	West Virginia	0.51
8.	California	1.67	34.	Arkansas	0.49
9.	Oregon	1.65	35.	Montana	0.47
10.	Nebraska	1.40	36.	South Carolina	0.46
11.	Colorado	1.35	37.	Michigan	0.42
12.	Connecticut	1.29	38.	Wisconsin	0.40
13.	Idaho	1.24	39.	Kentucky	0.35
14.	Nevada	1.22	40.	Hawaii	o.31
15.	Wyoming	1.18	41.	Missouri	0.30
16.	New York	1.15	42.	Alabama	0.29
17.	D.C	1.08	43.	Ohio	0.28
18.	Virginia	1.08	44.	Indiana	0.26
19.	Massachusetts	1.01	45.	Delaware	0.24
20.	Minnesota	0.99	46.	Maine	0.23
21.	Florida	0.92	47.	Vermont	0.22
22.	Mississippi	0.91	48.	North Carolina	0.20
23.	Pennsylvania	0.88	49.	Iowa	0.20
24.	Georgia	0.84	50.	Illinois	0.15
25.	New Jersey	0.80	51.	North Dakota	0.00
26.	Maryland	0.80			

TABLE XII

RANKED STATE TOTAL PARTICPATION

Rank	State	Players	Rank	State	Players
1.	California	208848	27.	Wisconsin	10254
2.	Texas	147628	28.	South Carolina	7675
3.	New York	101073	29.	Missouri	7640
4.	Washington	76633	30.	Indiana	7096
5.	Pennsylvania	50998	31.	Kansas	6440
6.	Florida	43600	32.	Kentucky	6250
7.	Oklahoma	40418	33.	Idaho	6132
8.	New Jersey	31220	34.	North Carolina	5987
9.	Virginia	29324	35.	Nevada	5974
10.	Massachusetts	28570	36.	Arkansas	5592
11.	Arizona	24816	37.	Alabama	5567
12.	Georgia	22918	38.	West Virginia	4943
13.	Colorado	22332	39.	Alaska	3804
14.	Oregon	22290	40.	D.C	3512
15.	Connecticut	20056	41.	Rhode Island	3239
16.	Utah	19667	42.	Iowa	3114
17.	Minnesota	19539	43.	New Hampshire	2634
18.	Michigan	19214	44.	Wyoming	2576
19.	Ohio	16859	45.	Montana	2317
20.	Maryland	16636	46.	South Dakota	2018
21.	Tennessee	15301	47.	Hawaii	1900
22.	New Mexico	13803	48.	Delaware	1233
23.	Louisiana	13467	49.	Maine	1200
24.	Nebraska	11005	50.	Vermont	877
25.	Mississippi	10917	51.	North Dakota	0
26.	Illinois	10756			



Total Youth Participation



Youth Participation Index

Figure 10. Youth Participation in Soccer

USSF. Table XIII, showing the total participation index, corroborates the previous findings and the Western bias can be seen in fig 11.

Thus one can conclude that for college indices of interest, the North East/New England area and the Midwest are the regions where the degree of emphasis is above average, while for participation variables, the Western half of the country is more prominent.

The County and City Scale

The next step is to examine the county and city level in order to determine more specific areas of interest. In absolute terms, as one would expect, the cities producing the greatest number of players are the country's larger cities (table XIV). St Louis produces the most players with 111 while the next largest production centres are Philadelphia and Dallas, both with 36. Some interesting features at the top of the list are Louisville, Kentucky and Columbia, Maryland, neither of which one would call 'major league' cities. Further down the list are quite a few cities which have no professional sports franchises and thus one would not expect these to be considered in locating a professional team. The indices used are for the dominant county so in the case of Chicago for example, Cook is the dominant county.

Table XV ranks the counties by the index of soccer player production. Of the 382 counties which produced at

TABLE XIII

STATES RANKED BY THE INDEX OF
TOTAL PARTICIPATION IN SOCCER

Rank	State	Index	Rank	State	Index
1.	Washington	3.67	27.	Rhode Island	0.67
2.	Utah	2.66	28.	Tennessee	0.65
3.	Oklahoma	2.64	29.	Louisiana	0.63
4.	New Mexico	2.09	30.	Montana	0.58
5.	Texas	2.05	31.	South Dakota	0.57
6.	Alaska	1.87	32.	New Hampshire	0.56
7.	Arizona	1.80	33.	Kansas	0.53
8.	California	1.74	34.	West Virginia	0.50
9.	Oregon	1.67	35.	South Carolina	0.48
10.	Colorado	1.53	36.	Arkansas	0.48
11.	Nevada	1.47	37.	Wisconsin	0.43
12.	Nebraska	1.38	38.	Delaware	0.41
13.	Idaho	1.28	39.	Michigan	0.41
14.	Connecticut	1.27	40.	Hawaii	o.38
15.	New York	1.13	41.	Vermont	0.33
16.	D.C	1.08	42.	Kentucky	0.33
17.	Wyoming	1.08	43.	Ohio	0.30
18.	Virginia	1.08	44.	Missouri	0.30
19.	Massachusetts	0.98	45.	Alabama	0.28
20.	Minnesota	0.94	46.	Indiana	0.25
21.	Florida	0.88	47.	Iowa	0.21
22.	Mississippi	0.85	48.	Maine	0.21
23.	Pennsylvania	0.85	49.	North Carolina	0.20
24.	New Jersey	0.83	50.	Illinois	0.18
25.	Georgia	0.83	51.	North Dakota	0.00
26.	Maryland	0.78			



Total Participation



Total Participation Index

Figure 11. Total Participation in Soccer

TABLE XIV

LEADING CITIES IN TOTAL PRODUCTION OF SOCCER PLAYERS

Rank	City	Players	Index
1.	St Louis MO	111	19.00
2.	Dallas TX	36	2.79
3.	Philadelphia PA	36	1.83
4.	Cincinnati OH	31	2.93
5.	Brooklyn NY	30	1.07
6.	Chicago IL	29	1.32
7.	Baltimore MD	25	2.46
8.	Atlanta GA	23	3.28
9.	Louisville KY	22	2.71
10.	Columbia MD	22	14.39
11.	Seattle WA	22	2.56
12.	Milwaukee WI	22	2.57
13.	San Jose CA	19	2.27
14.	Memphis TN	19	2.09

TABLE XV

LEADING COUNTIES RANKED BY THE INDEX
OF SOCCER PLAYER PRODUCTION

Rank	County	State	Population	Players Produced	Index
1.	Falls Church	VA	9515	8	65.23
2.	Manassas	VA	15438	6	30.15
3.	Williamsburg	VA	9870	3	23.58
4.	Rockwall	TX	14528	4	21.36
5.	Washington	WI	84848	22	20.11
6.	St Louis City	MO	453085	111	19.00
7.	Rowan	KY	19049	4	16.29
8.	Howard	MD	118572	22	14.39
9.	Adams	IL	71622	12	12.99
10.	Montgomery	TX	128487	18	10.86
11.	Fairfax	VA	596901	73	9.48
12.	Douglas	CO	25153	3	9.25
13.	Alexandria	VA	103217	11	8.26
14.	Bristol	RI	46942	5	8.26
15.	Tolland	CT	114823	12	8.10
16.	Mercer	NJ	307863	29	7.30
17.	Fauquier	VA	35889	3	6.48
18.	Monmouth	NJ	503173	42	6.47
19.	Rockdale	GA	36747	3	6.33
20.	Orleans	NY	38496	3	6.04
21.	Dutchess	NY	245055	18	5.69
22.	Madison	IL	247691	18	5.63
23.	Vanderburgh	IN	167515	12	5.55
24.	Leelanau	MI	14007	1	5.53
25.	Sumner	TN	85790	6	5.42
26.	Sagadahoc	ME	28795	2	5.38
27.	Montgomery	MD	579053	40	5.35
28.	Hunterdon	NJ	87361	6	5.32
29.	Du Page	IL	658835	45	5.29
30.	Schoharie	NY	29710	2	5.22

least one player, 259 produced at a level above the national norm. At the top end of the scale are the three Virginia counties of Falls Church, Manassas and Williamsburg. Fairfax, Alexandria and Faquier counties also figure prominently. Significantly, the top three counties all have populations of less than 20,000 and Williamsburg and Falls Church are both less than 10,000. The other three counties have more substantial base populations. Thus in considering potential franchise locations, the latter counties would be more appropriate. The City of St Louis is again a prime candidate as not only does it have an extremely high interest level (19.0) but it also has a large population (453,085). In addition, St Louis county with a population of 973,896 also has an above average index of 2.94.

Two Texas counties rank in the top ten which is perhaps a surprise considering the low quotient for the state as a whole. Rockwall has a low population of 14,528 but if one combines this with adjacent Dallas county, then the additional population is 1,556,390, while Dallas county itself has a high quotient of 2.79. Thus it would seem that the Dallas/Fort Worth area would be an excellent possibility for a soccer franchise.

At this stage it is appropriate to refer to fig 12 which shows the player production index for each county in the United States. Connecticut is a state that is prominent for all the variables. Tolland is the only



Figure 12. Soccer Player Production Index by County

entrant in the top 50 counties however. Hartford is the next Connecticut county with a quotient of 3.55 and a sizeable population of 807,766. Fairfield is another county with an impressive quotient of 2.78 and a population above 800,000. Either of these areas would be ideal for a franchise. Although the other counties in the state have quotients above the national average, none have the populations to match Fairfield and Hartford. The City of Hartford stands out as the perfect location both in terms of interest and centrality. Connecticut, however could be a case where a regional franchise might be a good idea. That is, a franchise that changes locations to accomodate a high level of interest throughout the state. Maryland has very high quotients in all the areas around the city of Baltimore with the exception of Baltimore county. The high population in and around this SMSA further suggests that Baltimore would be a very good location. As has been mentioned previously, Washington D.C has been the site of four different NASL franchises and it was suggested that interest levels might not have been sufficiently high. This seems to be coroborrated by the interest level indices. It is marginally above average on all the participation indices while on the production level it is well below average (0.36) although having a good college program index of 4.60. It would seem that a location south of the Potomac would be much more desirable than one in D.C itself and in

combination with Baltimore, would provide ample opportunity for people to watch professional soccer in the Maryland/DC/Virginia area.

New York and New Jersey both figure prominently in all the interest rankings. Only one of the counties in New Jersey has a quotient lower than 1.00. In addition, the majority of the counties have populations significantly higher than 100,000. On examining fig 12 it is clear that interest declines in southern New Jersey where quotients are only marginally above average. Trenton would be a good site as Mercer county has a very high interest level (7.30), though it is probably safe to assume that anywhere in the Newark/Jersey City metropolitan area would be a perfect location. In fact, this is the site of the Meadowlands where the Cosmos of the NASL played their games. Ignoring the managerial and financial issues this was considered the perfect NASL location because of its site and atmosphere.

On closer examination of up-state New York in fig 12, the region on the edge of Lake Ontario composed of Niagara, Orleans, Monroe and Wayne counties, must be given high priority. Although Orleans and Wayne have relatively small populations, Niagara and Monroe have nearly 1 million inhabitants between them. The biggest city in this region is Rochester which had a relatively succesful franchise in the NASL. The second area is the cluster of counties around Albany. The populations are somewhat

smaller and perhaps the interest levels are not quite high enough to justify locating a franchise here as it might prove to be too marginal in a small league. If the league was larger however (a point that will be examined later) then Albany would probably be a good location. Long Island/New York City is crying out for a franchise! Its population is considerable and if the team located in the Meadowlands was considered to be from New Jersey then New York City must have a representative too.

Although the Pennsylvania county with the highest quotient is Pike, its population of 18,271 is too small for it to be given much consideration. The next highest counties are all in and around the city of Philadelphia. Not only do these have high quotients but they also have large populations. In addition, the bordering counties of New Jersey also have high quotients, re-emphasising Philadelphia as an ideal site.

The Deep South and Florida is a region that does not figure very highly for any of the rankings and yet had a very successful NASL franchise in Tampa and other moderately prosperous teams in Miami and Jacksonville. Dade county has an index of 1.00 but the important point is its population is over 1.5 million; the major city being Miami. Duval county, containing Jacksonville, has a very high index of interest (2.03) and its population of 571,003 is also appreciably high. Orange (Orlando)is another possibility with a population of 471,016.

Hillsborough has a slightly lower quotient but a larger base population making Tampa a viable prospect. The only significant area in Georgia is the group of counties containing Atlanta; thus a significant base population is available.

Cuyahoga county, Ohio stands out with its high population of nearly 1.5 million and an interest level of 1.5. Hamilton also, with a population of nearly 900,000 and an emphasis quotient of 2.93 is significant. Montgomery has a reasonable population of 571,697 and a high quotient (2.03) as does Summit (524,472 and 2.81 respectively). Thus Cleveland, Cincinnati, Dayton and Akron in the state of Ohio would all be good potential sites.

In Kentucky, Jefferson county (Louisville) has a quotient of 2.71 and a population of 685,004. In addition, as was previously mentioned, Louisville had high absolute production of players and can thus be considered a possible location.

Illinois shows a strong concentration of interest around the Chicago area; Cook, Du Page and Lake all have high quotients and populations. In Minnesota, Minneapolis is the obvious choice for a location while in Wisconsin, Milwaukee is the only real area of interest. Kansas, although having a low interest level in general, reveals a high interest level in Johnson county with a population of over 270,000; Kansas City, Missouri is the dominant SMSA.

In the Far West, Los Angeles is almost considered a natural choice in locating a franchise. However, NASL franchises were never successful there despite it being a potentially good market with a large population. This is borne out by a low interest level of 0.36 (0.96 for Orange county). The areas that do stand out in California are Alameda and Santa Clara. So San Jose would probably be a good location with Oakland a possibility. King county Washington, containing Seattle, is a prime candidate for a franchise as it has a population of more than 1.25 million and a quotient of 2.56.

Possible Franchise Locations

In locating soccer franchises, one must consider that if the interest in a state as a whole is high, one must still pick a location within the state. The case of Missouri is an example where state interest is high but St Louis is the only area with any interest of consequence. As one is essentially considering a pool of potential spectators, then even if the state interest level is low, if a local concentration of interest is sufficiently high then this might be a good place to locate.

A number of cities have been determined as potential locations for a league. The next step is to determine the potential spectator 'pool' for each of these sites. Table XVI shows the results of this analysis along with the 1985 ADI ranking. Interestingly, the ADI shows that many of

TABLE XVI

POTENTIAL SPECTATOR POOL FOR SELECTED CITIES

City	Potential Crowd	T.V Potential
1. New York	-	1
2 Jersey City	-	1
3. Chicago	525665	3
4. Philadelphia	344145	4
5. Dallas	314054	8
6. San Jose	278955	20
7. D.C	263065	9
8. Los Angeles	249190	2
9. St Louis	248805	17
10 Boston	247240	6
11. Baltimore	244360	21
12. Detroit	218935	7
13. Seattle	209310	15
14. Cleveland	205060	11
15 San Francisco	193815	5
16. Hartford	189385	22
17. Milwaukee	166665	29
18. Atlanta	162880	16
19. Cincinnati	151185	28
20. Miami	126910	13
21. Rochester	123795	69
22. Tampa	119090	18
23. Dayton	104385	53
24. Louisville	96285	45
25. Pittsburgh	92815	12
26. Raleigh	89155	38
27. Minneapolis	77045	14
28. Houston	73600	10
29. Jacksonville	69545	64
30. Nashville	60620	31
31. Albany	53985	49
32. Norfolk	42600	47
33. Denver	42314	19
34. New Orleans	34410	35
35. Portland	27085	23
36. Richmond	11560	55

these locations are not considered very good T.V markets and so the results are more of an indication of pure interest in soccer. Los Angeles is a high entrant but has been ommited from initial consideration because of the experience of the NASL. Using the spectator potential technique, the city would appear in a 12 team league but this is merely because of the large populations of the surrounding counties, while interest levels in each are all less than 1.00.

New York City and Jersey City have automatically been assigned a franchise because the interest levels are very high in the whole of this region and so any assumption of a base population would be too arbitrary. Thus a 12 team league would be comprised of these two cities plus the following ten: Philadelphia, Arlington, Dallas, San Jose, Chicago, St Louis, Boston, Seattle, Detroit and Baltimore. This technique can then be used to add franchises to the league in multiples of four in order of suitability. The time period for these additions would be a managerial decision based on circumstances at the time. Clearly, an expansion as fast as that witnessed by the NASL needs to be avoided. Table XVII shows the expansion from a 12 to 28 team league with a suggestion as to an east/west conference alignment to minimize travelling time.

In considering competition, there is high school football on Friday nights, college on Saturdays and professional on Sundays. As soccer is a weekend sport

TABLE XVII

PROFESSIONAL SOCCER LEAGUE EXPANSION SHOWING POSSIBLE EAST/WEST CONFERENCE ALIGNMENT

West	East
Chicago	New York
San Jose	New Jersey
St Louis	Philadelphia
Detroit	D.C
Dallas	Baltimore
Seattle	Cleveland
MIlwaukee	Hartford
Atlanta	Cincinnati
Miami	Rochester
Tampa	Dayton
Louisville	Pittsburgh
Minneapolis	Raleigh
Houston	Nashville
Jacksonville	Albany

there is probably no way that it would be able to compete with the firmly entrenched sport of football. In early spring, the more northern cities would be too cold to play in and thus late spring/early summer is probably the ideal time to play. The amount of competition with a baseball team in the same market is determined by the baseball team's success at that particular period of time and thus is something that cannot be predicted. On the point of competition, of the 12 locations which would be added for a 20,24 and 28 team expansion, only Atlanta, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis and Houston would be competing with a major league baseball team. Thus these 'marginal' franchises would have a much better chance of survival (fig 13).

The majority of the locations are obvious considering the state interest levels, but some sites need to be justified. Firstly, the Deep South is a region which exhibits consistently low interest levels for all the soccer variables on the state level and yet there are three franchises located in the area, two of which are in Florida. Georgia is a state which appears to be especially inconducive but as can be seen from fig 12 there is a high concentration of interest around Atlanta. Additionally, a franchise located here, while having to compete with the Braves baseball team would have virtually no competition from other soccer teams. The two Florida sites have both been succesful NASL franchises although



Figure 13. Prospective Soccer Franchise Locations Indicating Competition with Major League Baseball Teams

state interest is relatively low. Thus, these enclaves of high interest justify a franchise location. There would also be no competition with other sports. Another area to discuss is the state of Ohio. Three franchises have been allocated but it might be that this is too many for such a small area considering the close proximity of other teams. Dayton might be discarded and a location in Los Angeles added instead, if national interest in soccer is at a high enough level.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The NASL was the first professional soccer league in the United States which had any kind of popular appeal and yet its sixteen year existence prompted many to doubt whether a soccer league could ever survive in a country with no soccer tradition. Four points must be considered in order to establish a professional league:

i) Americans generally like to watch American players, with whom they can identify with. Thus a league should restrict rosters to a maximum of two 'foreign' players as do the majority of the World's leagues. This would also give more playing time to native Americans and so although the calibre of play would be of a lower standard at first, it would provide players out of college with the experience they have lacked in the past.

ii) Player wages should be commensurate with the financial standing of the league. This could be achieved by having Americans on the team who have no reputation as did the 'star' foreign players of the NASL. Thus salaries could be kept to a reasonable proportion of total costs.

iii) A professional soccer league should dissociate itself from indoor soccer and the MISL. The uninitiated spectator seeing the freescoring excitement of the MISL versus the subtle, tactical entertainment of the real game will probably opt for the indoor version. An educated audience needs to be fostered.

iv) Television is an important way of spreading the gospel. Some soccer on T.V is better than none. Thus the media should be seen as a means of generating interest rather than as the main source of income.

It was decided that interest levels should be the major criteria in locating soccer franchises. Tradition does not appear overnight and so a league can only expand to any extent when the grass roots are present. It would appear that with participation rates increasing year by year, the time is ripe to initiate a professional league, using the locations described. However, although a high youth quotient indicates high interest, this does not necessarily correlate with a propensity to spectate because there is not always the financial means to spectate. However, in terms of franchise locations, youth players could be considered the paying customers of the future.

Twenty eight suitable locations have been chosen on the basis of interest levels. Although the NASL had franchises located in Canada, this study limited its scope to the United States because of the ease of standardizing

data. Thus, it is quite possible that suitable sites north of the border are being overlooked. The assessment relied heavily on college player production as this was data readily available on the county level. State data were only given brief consideration because of the internal variety possible. To improve this study, other variables of soccer interest need to be formulated on the county level; the problem of course is that data are not readily available at this level of definition.

It must be remembered that all these indices of interest are merely that: indicators of interest which do not by themseves mean that people will want to watch soccer.

The method of chosing the final locations was fairly crude and seven of the 28 locations chosen were never considered by the NASL. This could be a confirmation of the fact that that the NASL did not consider local interest to any great extent, as otherwise it might have chosen some of those seven sites. In addition, many of these sites are what could be considered 'smaller' cities. Thus soccer could become the first professional league in the United States to establish itself by taking advantage of locations which have previously been considered too risky.

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VITA 2

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